Value-of-information analyses provide a straightforward means for selecting the best next observation to make, and for determin ing whether it is better to gather additional information or to act immediately. Deter mining the next best test to perform, given a state of uncertainty about the world, requires a consideration of the value of making all pos sible sequences of observations. In practice, decision analysts and expert-system design ers have avoided the intractability of exact computation of the value of information by relying on a myopic approximation. Myopic analyses are based on the assumption that only one additional test will be performed, even when there is an opportunity to make a large number of observations. We present a nonmyopic approximation for value of infor mation that bypasses the traditional myopic analyses by exploiting the statistical proper ties of large samples.
Abstract
Value-of-information analyses provide a straightforward means for selecting the best next observation to make, and for determin ing whether it is better to gather additional information or to act immediately. Deter mining the next best test to perform, given a state of uncertainty about the world, requires a consideration of the value of making all pos sible sequences of observations. In practice, decision analysts and expert-system design ers have avoided the intractability of exact computation of the value of information by relying on a myopic approximation. Myopic analyses are based on the assumption that only one additional test will be performed, even when there is an opportunity to make a large number of observations. We present a nonmyopic approximation for value of infor mation that bypasses the traditional myopic analyses by exploiting the statistical proper ties of large samples.
INTRODUCTION
A person faced with a decision usually has the op portunity to gather additional information about the state of the world before taking action. Decision theoretic methods for determining the value of gath ering additional information date back to the earli est literature on the principle of maximum expected utility (MEU). These methods form an integral part of many probabilistic expert systems, such as Garry's congestive-heart-failure program (Garry and Barnett, 1968) and Pathfinder (Heckerman et al. , 1989; Hecker man et al., 1990) , an expert system that assists pathol ogists with the diagnosis of lymph-node diseases. To decide whether or not to perform a test, an expert system computes the value of information of that test. The system recommends that the test be performed if and only if the value of information exceeds the cost of the test. 1
In most decision contexts, a decision maker has the option to perform several tests, and can decide which test to perform after seeing the results of all previ ous tests. (Heckerman, 1990) .
1This prescription for action assumes that the delta prop erty holds. See Section 3. 
3

MYOPIC ANALYSIS
Let us assume that the user of a diagnostic system has instantiated zero or more pieces of evidence in the in fluence diagram shown in Figure 1 . We can propagate the effects of these instantiations to the uninstantiated nodes, and remove the instantiated nodes from the in fluence diagram. This removal leaves an influence dia gram of the same form as that shown in Figure l . To simplify our notation, we continue to refer to the re maining pieces of evidence as E1, � •. .. , En; also, we use p( H) to refer to the probability of the hypothesis H, given the instantiated evidence.
The decision maker now considers whether he should observe another piece of evidence before acting. A myopic procedure for identifying such evidence com putes, for each piece of evidence, the expected utility of the decision maker under the assumption that the decision maker will act after observing only that piece of evidence. In addition, the procedure computes his expected utility if he does not observe any evidence before making his decision. If, for each piece of evi dence, the expected utility given that evidence is less than the expected utility given no evidence, then the decision maker acts immediately in accordance with
Equation 6. Otherwise, the decision maker observes the piece of evidence with the highest expected utility; then, the myopic procedure repeats this computation to identify additional evidence for observation. Because the myopic procedure allows for the gathering of addi tional evidence, the procedure is inconsistent with its own assumptions. We return to this observation in the next section.
In the remainder of this section, we examine the com putation of expected utilities and introduce notation.
Let EU(E, CE) denote the expected utility of the de cision maker who will observe E at cost CE, and then act. Let CE(E, CE) be the certain equivalent of this
CE(E, CE) = u -1(EU(E, CE)) (9) where U(-) is the decision maker's utility func tion: a monotonic increasing function that maps the value of an outcome (e.g., in dollars) to the decision maker's utility for that outcome. Similarly, let EU(</>, 0) de note the expected utility of the decision maker if he acts immediately, and let CE(</>, 0) denote the certain equivalent of this situation. Thus, in the myopic pro cedure, a decision maker should observe the piece of evidence E for which the quantity
is maximum, provided it is greater than 0.
In this paper, to simplify the discussion, we assume that the delta property holds. 2 The delta property
states that an increase in value of all outcomes in a lottery by an amount 6 increases the certain equiva lent of that lottery by 6 (Howard, 1967) . Under this assumption, we obtain
where CE(E, 0) is the certain equivalent of observing E at no cost. Therefore, we have
where
2The primary result of this research-that we can use the central-limit theorem to make tractable an approximate nonmyopic analysis-is unaffected by this assumption.
is the value of information of observing E. 3 The quan tity V I(E) represents the largest amount that the de cision maker would be willing to pay to observe E. When we compare Expression 10 with Equation 12, we see that, in the myopic procedure, a decision maker should observe the piece of evidence E (if any) for which the quantity V I(E)-CE =NV I(E) (14) is maximum and positive. We call NVI(E) the net value of information of observing E.
The decision maker usually specifies directly the cost of observing evidence. In contrast, we can compute V I(E) from the decision maker's utilities and proba bilities. Specifically, from Equations 9 and 13, we have
To simplify notation, we use the abbreviations
Thus, we obtain
The computation of EU(</>) is straightforward. We 
and
where EU(EIH) and EU(EI-.H) are the expected util ities of observing E, given H and � H, respectively. To obtain the expected utility of observing E, we average these two quantities
EU(E) = p(H)EU(EIH) + p( -. H)EU(EI�H) (19)
To compute V I(E), we combine Equations 15, 16, and 19.
3 0ther names for VI(E) include the value of perfect in formation of E and the value of clairvoyance on E.
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NONMYOPIC ANALYSIS
As we mentioned in the previous section, the my opic procedure for identifying cost-effective observa tions includes the incorrect assumption that the deci sion maker will act after observing only one piece of evidence. This myopic assumption can affect the di agnostic accuracy of an expert system because infor mation gathering might be halted even though there exists some set of features whose value of information is greater that the cost of its observation. For example, a myopic analysis may indicate that no feature is cost effective for observation, yet the value of information for one or more feature pairs (were they computed) could exceed the cost of their observation.
There has been little investigation of the accuracy of myopic analyses. In one analysis, Kalagnanam and Henrion, 1990 , showed that a myopic policy is opti mal, when the decision maker's utility function U(·) is linear, and the relationship between hypotheses and evidence is deterministic. In an empirical study, Garry, 1968, demonstrated that the use of a myopic analysis does not diminish significantly the diagnostic accuracy of an expert system for congenital heart disease.
In a correct identification of cost-effective evidence, we should take into account the fact that the deci sion maker may observe more than one piece of evi dence before acting. This computation must consider all possible ordered sequences of evidence observation, and is, therefore, intractable.
Let us consider, however, the following nonmyopic ap proximation for identifying features that are cost ef fective to observe. Again, we assume that the delta property holds. First, under the myopic assumption, we compute the net value of information for each piece of evidence. If there is at least one piece of evi dence that has a positive net value of information, then we identify for observation the piece of evidence with the highest net value of information. Other wise, we arrange the pieces of evidence in descend ing order of their net values of information. Let us label the pieces of evidence E1, �, . .. , E,_., such that NVI(E;) > NVI(Ei), if and only if i > j.
Next, we compute the net value of information of each subsequence of E1, E2, ..
• , E,_.. That is, form= 1, 2, ... n, we compute the difference between the value of information for observing E1, E2, ..• , Em, and the cost of observing this sequence of evidence. If any such net value of information is greater than 0, then we identify E1 as a piece of evidence that is cost effec tive to observe. Once the decision maker has observed E1. we repeat the entire computation described in this section.
This approach does not consider all possible test se quences, but it does overcome one limitation of the myopic analysis. In particular, the method can identify sets of features that are cost effective for observa tion, even when the observation of each feature alone is not cost effective.
VALUE OF INFORMATION FOR A SUBSET OF EVIDENCE
As in the myopic analysis, we assume that the decision maker can specify the cost of observing a set of evi dence. In this section, we show how we can compute the value of information for a set of evidence from the decision maker's utilities and probabilities.
As in the previous section, let us suppose that the decision maker has the option to observe a particu lar subset of evidence { E1, �, ... , Em} before acting. There are 2m possible instantiations of the evidence in this set, corresponding to the observation of E; or -.E; for every i. Let E denote an arbitrary instantiation; and let Ev and E�v denote the set of instantiations E such that p(HIE) > p• and p(HIE) � p•, respectively.
The computation of the value of information for the observation of the set { E1, �' ... ,Em} parallels the myopic computation. In particular, we have where and
To obtain V I(E), we combine Equations 15, 16, and 20.
When m is small, we can compute directly the sums in Equations 21 and 22. When m is large, we can com pute these sums using an approximation that involves the central limit theorem as follows. First we express the sums in terms of weights of evidence. We have
£EC�v where W and w• are defined in Equation 7. The term p(W > W'IH), for example, is the probability that the sum of the weight of evidence from the observation of E 1 , � ... . ,Em exceeds w•. That is, p(W > w•IH) is the probability that the decision maker will take action D after observing the evidence, given that H is true.
Next, let us consider the weight of evidence for one piece of evidence. We have w;
In p(E;!H) p(E;J�H)
In P(�E,jH) p(�E,J�H) p(w;IH l pjw;J_-,Hl p(E;IH) p(E;I..,H) p(..,E;IH) p(..,E;I..,H)
To simplify notation, we let p(E;IH) = a and p(E;I..,H) = fl. The expectation and variance of w, given H and ..,H, are then
Var(wi..,H) = {3(1 -fJ)ln2 ;�� = �; (30)
Now, we take advantage of the additive property of weights of evidence. The central-limit theorem states that the sum of independent random variables ap proaches a normal distribution when the number of variables becomes large. Furthermore, the expecta tion and variance of the sum is just the sum of the expectations and variances of the individual random variables, respectively. Because we have assumed that evidence variables are independent, given H or ..,H, the expected value of the sum of the weights of evi dence for E1,
'i=l
The variance of the sum of the weights is m Var(WIH) = LVar(w;IH)
i=l Thus, p(WIH), the probability distribution over W, is
The expression for ..,H is similar.
p(W1H) w w* Figure 2 : The probability that the total weight of evi dence will exceed the threshold weight is the area un der the normal curve above the threshold weight w• (shaded region).
Finally, given the distributions for H and ..,H, we eval uate Equations 23 through 26 using an estimate or table of the cumulative normal distribution. We have
where J.L = EV(WIH) and u = Var(WIH). The prob ability that the weight will exceed w• corresponds to the shaded area in Figure 2 . Again, the expression for ..,H is similar. In this analysis, we ass ume that no probability (p(E;IH) or p(E;I..,H)) is equal to 0 or 1. Thus, all expected values and variances are finite. We relax this assumption in the next section.
RELAXATION OF THE ASSUMPTIONS
We can relax the ass umption that evidence is two valued with little effort. In particular, we can extend easily the odds-likelihood inference rule, Equation 1, and its logarithmic transform, to include multiple valued evidential variables. In addition, the computa tion of means and variances for multiple-valued eviden tial variables (see Equations 27 through 30) is straight forward.
In addition, we can relax the ass umption that no prob ability is equal to 0 or 1. For example, let us suppose that 0 < p(EiiH) =a< 1 p(Eii..,H) = {3 = 1 o < p(E;IH) < I, i=l,2, ... ,n(i#j) 0 < p(E;I..,H) < 1, i = 1,2, ... ,n (i #j)
Using Equations 27 through 30, we obtain EV(wjiH) = +oo 
If �Ei is observed, W = +oo, and
We compute p(W > w•JHEJ) as described in Equa tions 31 through 34, replacing EV(wiiH) with Wj in the summation of Equation 31, and Var(w1JH) with 0 in the summation of Equation 32. The other terms in the summations remain the same, because we have as sumed that evidence variables are independent, given H or �H. This approach generalizes easily to multiple valued evidence variables and to cases where more than one probability is equal to 0 or 1.
We can extend our analysis to special cases of condi tional dependence among evidence variables. For ex ample, Figure 3 shows a schematic of the belief net work for Pathfinder. In this model, there are groups of dependent evidence, where each group is condition ally independent of all other groups. We can apply our analysis to this model by using a clustering tech nique described by Pearl (Pearl, 1988) (pp. 197-204) .
As in the previous section, suppose we want to com pute the value of information for the set of evidence S = {E 1 , E2, ... , E m }. For each group of dependent features Gk, we cluster those variables in the inter section of S and Gk into a single variable. Then, we average out all variables in the belief network that are not in S. What remains is a set of clustered vari ables that are conditionally independent, given H and �H. We can now apply our analysis-generalized to multiple-valued variables-to this model.
There are special class es of dependent distributions for which the central-limit theorem is valid. We can use this fact to extend our analysis to other cases of depen dent evidence. For example, the central-limit theorem applies to distributions that form a Markov chain, pro vided the transition probabilities in the chain are not correlated (Billingsley, 1968) . Thus, we can extend our analysis to belief networks of the form shown in Figure 4 . We can generalize the value-of-information analysis even further, if we use the Markov extension in combination with the clustering approach described in the previous paragraph. We can extend our analysis involving the cen tral-limit theorem to this case.
It is difficult for us to extend the analysis to include multiple-valued hypotheses and decisions. The algebra becomes more complex, because the simple p• model for action no longer applies. There is, however, the opportunity for applying our technique to more com plex problems. In particular, we can abstract a given decision problem into one involving a binary hypoth esis and decision variable. For example, we can ab stract the problem of determining which of n diseases is present in a patient into one of determining whether the disease is benign or malignant. In doing so, we ignore details of the decision maker's preferences, and we introduce dependencies among evidence variables. Nonetheless, the benefits of a nonmyopic analysis may outweigh these drawbacks in some domains.
7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We presented work on the use of the central-limit the orem to compute the value of information for sets of tests. Our technique provides a nonmyopic, yet tractable alternative to traditional myopic analyses for determining the next best piece of evidence to observe. Our approach is limited to information-acquisition de cisions for problems involving (1) specific classes of de pendencies among evidence variables, and (2) binary hypothesis and action variables. Additional research, however, may help to relax these restrictions. For now, we pose the nonmyopic methodology as a new special case tool for identifying cost-effective observations. We hope to see empirical comparisons of the relative accu racy of the nonmyopic analysis with that of traditional myopic analyses. We expect that the results of such evaluations will be sensitive to the details of the ap plication areas.
